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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
AMERICA. a Corporation, 
Plain tiff-Re.sponden t. 
vs. 
PAUL J. HENICH. dba P. G. & H. GEN-
ERAL CONTRACTORS, ELLEN JANE 
HENICH, his wife, Defendanis, 
MAX S. ANDREWS and NED E. SHURT-
LEFF, individually and as a co-partner-
ship dba SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, and 
SHURTLEFF & ANDREWS. INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
No. 
9596 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
Plaintiff brought an action upon a written inden1nity agree-
ment. The defendants signed the indemnity agreement and 
pursuant thereto, a contractor's bond was issued. The contractor 
became insolvent and the plaintiff was required to pay creditors 
of the contractor by virtue of its bond. The defendants denied 
liability under the jndemnity agreement. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the court sitting without a jury, the 
Honorable Ray VanCott, Jr., presiding. The trial court found 
in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants and granted 
judgment thereon. Defendants Max Andrews and Ned E. 
Shurtleff individually and doing business as Shurtleff & Andrews 
Construction Company, a partnership, and Shurtleff & Andrews, 
Inc., appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appealing defendants seek reversal of the judgment 
or a new trial. The plaintiff seeks affirmance of its judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff is an insurance company doing business in 
the State of Utah. Part of its business consists of writing bonds 
for construction contractors through its local agents. Dale 
Barton is an insurance agent doing business as the Dale Barton 
Agency. Dale Barton represents the plaintiff and other com-
panies in writing bonds (TR. 65 & 66). Prior to December, 
1959~ the Dale Barton Agency had written several bonds for 
Paul J. Henich, dba P. G. & H. General Contractors, on various 
construction jobs (TR. 217-219). The bonds were written 
through the plaintiff company. In 1958, the Dale Barton 
Agency had Henich and his wife execute a general application 
and agreement of indemnity for contract bonds with the plaintiff 
company. The agreement provided that Henich and his wife 
'Nould indemnify the plaintiff company for any and all losses 
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suffered on bonds previously written or to be written in the 
future for Henich. (Ex. No. 1). In December of 1959, Henich 
contacted Barton at his agency and received a Bid Bond on a 
project known as the St. Joseph Convent job in Ogden, Utah, 
and stated that if he was successful on the bid he would be 
required to furnish a payment and performance bond (TR. 72). 
On December 23, 1959, the contract was awarded to Henich 
with the requirement of a bond in the sum of $140,000.00 
(TR. 219). When Henich was notified that he was the success-
ful bidder, he brought the contract to the Barton agency where 
a bond was written in the sum of 50lf0 of the contract figure 
(TR. 72). No indemnity was required on the bond other than 
the aforementioned general indemnity agreement given to the 
plaintiff by Henich and his wife. The 50lfo bond provided 
by Barton was not acceptable to the architect on the convent 
project and in January a new bond was executed by Barton 
for the full amount of the contract, or $140,000.00. The 
second bond written on the convent project was pre-dated to 
December 23, 1959, to conform to the date shown on the 
contract, although the same was not executed and delivered 
until January of 1960 (TR. 72-73, Ex. No. 13). 
During December, 1959, and the first part of January, 1960, 
Henich was negotiating with the Pacific Intermountain Express 
Company for a contract to build their terminal building to be 
located in Salt Lake City, ·utah (TR. 161-162). On the 18th 
or 19th of January, 1960, Henich talked to Dale Barton 
concerning a bond on this project if he was successful in nego-
tiating a contract ( TR. 164-167, 169) . At this time, the 
estimated cost of the project was approximately $275,000.00, 
but had not been ascertained with certainty (TR. 160-161). 
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Sometime during the week of January 25 to January 30, 1960, 
I-Ienich came to the Dale Barton Agency and informed Barton 
that he had been awarded the contract on the PIE job and 
asked Barton if he could furnish him with a bond to cover 
this contract (TR. 74, 75). At this time, Barton informed 
Henich that his financial position was not such that additional 
bond credit could be given to him (TR. 76). It was also pointed 
out to him that since the Convent project had just commenced, 
he would have a work load in excess of $400,000.00 in opera-
tion at one time and that in Barton's opinion he was not of 
such financial stability to assure performance of both projects 
at the same time (TR. 75-89) . At this time Barton refused 
Henich's request for a bond on the PIE project. A day or two 
later Henich contacted Barton again and asked Barton if he 
would be interested in having Shurtleff & Andrews indemnify 
him and asked if he would then write the bond (TR 76, 77). 
Barton suggested to Henich that a financial statement of 
Shurtleff & Andrews be presented for examination and the 
matter would be taken under consideration. A financial state-
ment by Dun & Bradstreet on Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., was 
given to Barton by telephone ( TR. 80) . After giving con-
sideration to the finances of Shurtleff & Andrews, Barton 
informed Henich that he still could not suggest to the plaintiff 
that they write an additional bond for Henich (TR. 76-78). 
Henich then asked Barton if the plaintiff company would be 
interested in writing the bond on the PIE contract if Henich 
could secure the indemnity of not only Shurtleff & Andrews, 
Inc., but Ned Shurtleff and Max Andrews individually, as 
well as the Shurtleff & Andrews Construction Company, a 
partnership (TR. 77-78). At this time, Barton again told 
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Henich to obtain a financial statement on the partnership and 
present it for consideration and examination. Shurtleff and 
Andrews then contacted their local accountant, Wood, Child, 
Mann & Smith, and requested a written financial report on 
the construction company so that Barton could examine the 
san1e (TR. 138, 139, 144, 175). The financial report was 
prepared and typed by the accounting firm on January 28, 
1960, and delivered to the defendants on that date (TR 203-
209). The report was then brought to the office of Dale 
Barton and examined by him. It was then Barton's opinion 
that there was sufficient financial stability among all of the 
defendants to guarantee proper performance of the two projects 
and he contacted the plaintiff and received oral authority to 
execute the PIE bond. 
A general application for contract bonds and indemnity 
agreement, exhibit No. 2, and a corporate resolution, ex-
hibit No. 3, were then prepared in the Dale Barton Agency 
by Doris Farley, secretary, who did the typing on the docu-
ments (TR 94, 179-182). She testified that exhibits 2 
and 3 were fully typed by her before they left the office 
and that the only part of the documents that was not 
fully completed was the acknowledgment forms. Henich 
then picked up exhibits 2 and 3 and left the Dale Barton 
Agency (TR. 180-183). During the time Barton was examining 
the financial statements of the defendants, Henich also brought 
to him an unsigned copy of the proposed contract with PIE 
wherein it stated that the contract price was to be $271,030.00 
(TR. 116, 164, 223 and 224). With this information, Doris 
Farley then typed exhibits 2 and 3 and included the Convent 
project and the PIE project therein, and limited the agreements 
5 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to these two projects and gave them to Henich (TR. 223-224). 
Henich then returned with exhibits 2 and 3 signed by all of 
the appellants (TR. 182-183). Doris Farley then notarized the 
appellants' signatures and in her acknowledgment placed the 
date of December 23, 1959, so as to conform to the date of 
the St. Joseph Convent project (TR. 183-184, 187). 
On or about February 1, 1960, Barton prepared the bonds, 
dated the same to conform with the contract, and forwarded 
them to PIE in California (TR. 79, 89 and Exhibit 4). 
During July of 1960, Barton received notice fromHenich 
that he was in financial difficulty on the PIE job. Barton 
immediate! y notified B. E. Schalow, claims representative 
for the plaintiff company, and a meeting was held in Bar-
ton's office and attended by Barton, Schalow and Henich. 
At this time, Schalow suggested that the meeting adjourn 
to the offices of Shurtleff & Andrews so that they could be 
informed as to the developments at that time. At this point, 
it was not known that Henich was also defaulting on the 
Convent project. He represented that he was financially 
solvent on that project and anticipated a profit. The meeting 
\vas adjourned to the appellants' office, where a conversation 
was had with Shurtleff concerning the losses expected on the 
PIE project. Schalo\v informed Shurtleff that it was his sug-
gestion that contact be made with the authorities at the St. 
Joseph Convent to suspend payment of any further funds 
to 1-Ienich in an effort to n1inimize the anticipated losses on the 
PIE project. Shurtleff stated that he would have to consult 
\vith Andrews, who was out of town at the time, before any 
action could be taken. At no time did Shurtleff deny respon-
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sibility under the indemnity agreement for the PIE contract 
at this point (TR. 11-15, 155, 156). 
Short! y thereafter it was learned that Henich was also 
defaulting on the Convent project and there would be no 
surplus funds to apply to the PIE losses. Shurtleff and Andrews 
then requested copies of exhibits 2 and 3 from the plaintiff 
and after reviewing the same, sent a letter to the plaintiff 
denying responsibility by virtue of exhibits 2 and 3 (Ex. No. 7). 
Thereafter, the plaintiff, with approval of Henich, paid the 
creditors under the PIE project and brought the present action 
against the defendants (TR. 22, 23). It should be noted that 
at no time have any of the defendants herein denied signing 
exhibits 2 and 3. They have maintained that since the indemnity 
agreement and corporate resolution are both dated December 
23, 1959, and the PIE project was not awarded at that time, 
that therefore they are not bound by either agreement. 
Appellants further admit that the reason they signed 
exhibits 2 and 3 was that they were friends of Henich and 
thought Henich was an up and coming contractor, that they 
had received business from him previous to this time and 
expected future business from him as well as from others that 
he would refer to them (TR. 137, 138). 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DIS-
MISS THE ACTION AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENT'S 
CASE. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVI-
DENCE THAT THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT \XlAS 
EXECUTED BETWEEN JANUARY 25, 1960, AND JANU-
ARY 30, 1960. 
A. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS IN WRIT-
ING AND MET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS. 
B. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOT AL-
TERED UNDER THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
POIN'f III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
INDEMNITY AGREEMENT COVERED THE P.I.E. BOND. 
A. THERE WAS NO ALTERATION OF THE IN-
DEMNITY AGREEMENT. 
B. THE DATE ON THE INSTRUMENTS WAS IM-
MATERIAL AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE APPEL-
LANTS AS INDEMNITORS. 
C. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOT EXECUTED 
DECEMBER 23, 1959. 
POINT IV 
RESPONDENT MADE NO ADMISSIONS PRECLUD-
ING THE TRIAL COURT FROM FINDING IN ITS 
FAVOR. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
1~HE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO DIS-
.NliSS THE ACTION AT THE CLOSE OF RESPONDENT'S 
CASE. 
The indemnity agreement (Ex. 2) and the Corporate 
Resolution (Ex. 3) were received in evidence after it was 
admitted that the signatures on both documents were genuine 
(Tr. 5, 6, 9, 10). With exhibits 2 and 3 having been received 
in evidence and admittedly executed by the appellants, the 
respondent had then proved a prima facie case of liability 
based upon the written documents which are clear and un-
ambiguous. Subsequent to the admission of exhibits 2 and 3, 
the respondent then offered and the court received evidence 
of the respondent's damages suffered as evidenced by drafts 
that had been issued by the respondent to cover the various 
losses under the bond. Pursuant to stipulation of the appellants, 
the respondent's offer of proof on damages was received (Tr. 
22-24, Ex. 8). 
There was evidence that the indemnity agreement and 
corporate resolution were in fact executed subsequent to the 
date the instruments bear. This evidence was, however, elicited 
from respondent's \Vitness by the appellants on cross-exami-
nation (Tr. 41-43). Appellants, at page 6 of their Brief, allege 
that the respondent impeached its own evidence by testimony 
that the indemnity agreement and corporate resolution had been 
executed at a date subsequent to the date the documents bear. 
It should be further noted that Mr. Schalow, upon whose 
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testimony appellants were relying to impeach the dates on the 
documents, stated at all times that he did not personally 
know when the documents ·v,ere executed but was merely 
testifying from reading depositions and correspondence of 
other persons. 
Appellants offer the cases of Davenport vs. Stratten, 149 
Pac. 2d 4, Peters vs. Taylor, 251 Pac. 446, and Goldsworthy 
vs. Anderson, 21 Pac. 2d 718, as authority for the rule that a 
party introducing an exhibit into evidence is thereby bound 
by its provisions and terms and cannot later impeach the same 
(Appellants' Brief, pages 6 & 7). Respondent agrees that as 
a general statement of the rule these authorities are correct. 
It should be noted, however, that the cases previously men-
tioned say, as does the rule itself, that the party may not 
contradict the terms or provisions of the instrument itself, 
but in no way affects the right of a party offering an exhibit 
to show its actual date of execution. In the Davenport case, 
supra, an exhibit was offered showing an accounting statement 
of money paid a.nd money due and the court stated that the 
party offering the exhibit without qualification could not then 
produce evidence to contradict or dispute the sums alleged in 
the statement. There was nothing at all to show that the 
exhibit had been postdated or predated. A similar situation 
was presented in the Peters case, supra, wherein the court stated 
at page 450: 
{·I-I ow ever, this rule, like all general rules, has its 
exceptions." 
In the Goldsvvorthy case, supra, the plaintiff tried to shov; 
that the bank \vas insolvent when he made his deposit. He 
10 
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introduced a bank examiner's report which in fact showed 
that the bank was not insolvent at that time. He later tried to 
itnpeach the contents of the report but was not permitted to 
do so. All of the cases previously cited by the appellants show 
a definite offer by the party introducing the document to 
materially change its terms, provisions, or contents. These 
cases therefore are not applicable to the present situation inas-
much as the respondent in the instant case did not and never 
has atten1pted to change the terms, or provisions, or wording, 
of the indemnity agreement or corporate resolution. 
During respondent's case in chief, it did not offer to sho\v 
that the dates on exhibits 2 and 3 were not the dates of execu-
tion as such was immaterial. 1·his information was elicited 
by the appellants on cross-examination. At the time appellants' 
counsel asked Schalow the dates that exhibits 2 and 3 were 
executed, he knew that the documents were not signed on the 
date that they bear. When Schalow answered with the only 
truthful answer that could be given, that the documents were 
actually executed during the last week in January, 1960, 
counsel then complains that the respondent is trying to impeach 
its own evidence. 
The authorities are 1n agreement that parole evidence 
may be received to show or prove the actual date of execution 
of a written instrument or contract. In doing so, the party 
offering the evidence is not altering the terms, provisions or 
substance of the contract but merely showing an occurrence 
of time and therefore there is no impeachment of the document. 
This court has considered the problem in the case of 0 lsen 
vs. Reese, 114 Utah 411, 200 Pac. 2d 733. In this case a building 
11 
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contractor entered into a written agreement with the defendant 
to do some remodeling work. A contract was signed and the 
work was commenced. Plaintiff was required to sue the 
defendant for payment. On cross-examination of the plaintiff 
it was discovered that at the time the contract was dated the 
plaintiff did not have a contractor's license and therefore, by 
statute, his contract was unenforceable. He then offered to 
prove that the date the contract bore was not the date it was 
executed, that in fact it was signed at a time subsequent to 
the date when he was issued his contractor's license but back-
dated to conform to the date on which he began his preliminary 
work on the job. The trial court refused plaintiff's offer of 
proof. On appeal this court stated: 
((The authorities are practically unanimous to the 
effect that parole evidence is competent to establish 
the true date of execution and delivery of the contract 
regardless of the fact that it differs from the date shown 
in the body of the contract. While the date shown in 
the contact may be presumed to be the date of execu-
tion, this presumption is rebuttable and parole evidence 
is acceptable for this purpose. American Jurisprudence, 
Vol. 20, Evidence, page 977, states the general rule 
to be as follows: 'An exception is recognized to the 
parole evidence rule in the case of dates upon instru-
tnents. It is said that the rule that parole evidence 
cannot be received to contradict a written contract does 
not apply to .the date, which may be contradicted 
u·henever it is material to the issues to do so, or, if 
lacking, may be supplied by parole or other competent 
testimony. The true date of the execution and delivery 
of a contract may be shown by parole, at least where 
the instrument contains no date. This is true even as 
to instruments which are required by the statute to be 
in writing, such as chattel mortgages.' The evidence 
12 
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being competent, the rematntng question is wiiether 
or not the plaintiff proceeded properly to get the issue 
before the court." (Italics ours). 
In the case of Hewes vs. Taylor, 70 Pa. St. 387, wherein 
the date of a written guarantee had been inaccurately inserted, 
the court said: 
"It is the agreement to guarantee the debt or default 
of another which the act requires to be in writing. The 
agreen1ent would be good without a date, or even if it 
had an impossible date. The date is a circumstance 
of identification as to time only; proof of it does not 
add to, alter or change the terms of the agreement, 
although it might be forgery if inserted without consent 
or authority.'' 
The weight of authority supports the rule that parole evi-
dence is competent to show that a written instrument bearing 
one date was executed on a different day. See an annotation 
on the subject at Annotated Cases 1913A, page 496, wherein 
an extensive list of jurisdictions is contained with cases in 
accord with this rule. See also the case of District of Columbia 
vs. Camden Iron Works, U. S. Supreme Court, 181 U.S. 453, 
45 Lawyer's Edition 948. In that case a contract bore a date 
previous to the day of its actual execution. The plaintiff sued 
on the contract and introduced parole evidence to show its 
execution date. The U.S. Supreme Court, speaking through 
Chief Justice Fuller, stated at page 953: 
c cThe next proposition of the District, that it was not 
competent for plaintiff below to show by parole that 
the contract \Vas finally executed and delivered by the 
District at a date subsequent to the date of the contract, 
is without merit . . . It is well settled, that, in such 
circumstances, it may be averred and shown that a deed, 
13 
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bond, or other instrument was in fact made, executed, 
and delivered at a date subsequent to that stated on 
its face.'' 
See also Cowles Publishing Co. vs. Mclvlann, 167 ALR 1164, 
172 Pac. 2d 235, wherein the court said: 
' (Parol evidence is admissible to contradict the date 
of a written instrument. Furthermore, it is always 
competent to show by parol evidence that the date 
inserted in a written instrument was not the date of 
delivery. Such evidence does not contradict or vary 
the language of the contract. As stated in 3 Jones 
Commentaries On Evidence, 2d Edition Sec. 1511, 
Page 2757: The general rule that antecedent and 
contemporaneous oral stipulations cannot be received 
to alter or vary the term of a written contract has no 
application when the execution of the writing is the 
subject of inquiry. It presupposes the due execution 
and delivery of the writing in a way to bind both 
parties to its terms.' " 
Appellants, in their Brief, then go on to challenge the 
respondent's right to produce evidence to contradict the cer-
tificate of acknowledgement on exhibit 2. Respondent agrees 
that a certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie evidence 
of the date of execution of a document and that to vary this 
date the party must show by clear and convincing evidence 
that the certificate is inaccurate. This, however, may be done 
by either party to the action. See Northcrest vs. Walker Bank 
& Trust Company, 122 Utah 268, 248 Pac. 2d 692, wherein 
this court stated at page 273 as follows: 
''Many authorities hold that where a party did not 
in fact appear before the notary, nor otherwise ackno,vl-
edge the deed before him that the notary may testify 
14 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to such facts in impeachment of his certificate. 1 CJS, 
Acknowledgments, Section 139, Page 900; Peoples 
Gas Company vs. Fletcher, 81 Kansas 76, 105 Pac. 24, 
·i LRA, NS, 1170 and 1171. 1 Am. Jur. 380, Ac-
knowledgments~ Section 154, states: 
rr ••• The trend of authority, however, is in favor 
of ad1nitting any evidence that may haz:e a tendency 
to proz;e the truth, and a more liberal rule permits the 
officer to be called as a witness and compelled under 
oath to state the true facts of the transaction so far 
as he can remember them, whether he acted under 
mistake, misapprehension, or in collusion with the 
party to be benefited by taking the acknowledgment ... " 
(Italics ours) . 
The court then went on to say: 
((Wigmore in his work on evidence, Vol. 2 3rd 
Edition, Section 5 30, in discussing this problem con-
cludes that there is really no basis for excluding the 
notary's testimony merely because it contradicts his 
previous certificate. He says: t • • • The notion has no 
better grounds for support here than elsewhere. If 
the certificate is not absolutely conclusive and may be 
other,vise shown to be incorrect, then the official should 
be equally competent. The official doubtless should be 
punished, but not the party needing his testimony. The 
official is clearly capable of falsification, but the value 
of his testimony should be left to the jury.' " 
The court then said: 
"We are in accord with the foregoing rule as better 
serving the purpose of getting at the truth and doing 
justice between the parties." 
The appellants at page 7 of their Brief, say the cases also 
reason that the party for whose benefit the notarization has 
been executed cannot cause the certification to be impeached, 
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and offer in support thereof, Gatewood vs. Roquemore, 118 
Pac. 2d 1020. This case does not in any respect deny the right 
of either party to impeach an acknowledgment. The court 
merely stated at page 1021: 
((The uncorroborated testimony of the grantor is not 
sufficient if the surrounding facts are as consistent 
vrith the truth of the certificate as they are with the 
denial of the grantor." 
Any party to an action may impeach the certificate of 
acknowledgment in an effort to get to the truth of the matter. 
Appellants, in their Brief, constantly refer to the notary 
public as an employee of the respondent. This is not so. The 
testitnony clearly shows that Doris Farley was an employee 
of the Dale Barton Insurance Agency and had no connection 
with the plaintiff (Tr. 84). 
The allegation in respondent's complaint, stating that 
on or about December 23, 1959, an indemnity agreement was 
executed, (Ex. 2) is of no material bearing on the validity of 
the agreement. 
The appellants were not in any way surprised or misled 
to their detriment by the pleadings. The evidence is clear that 
this matter was amply clarified by answers to interrogatories 
propounded by appellants as well as the issues set forth in the 
pretrial order (R. 42, 51 and Tr. 6). It should be further 
pointed out that when the complaint was filed it was based 
upon a written indemnity agreement contained in respondent's 
files in Denver, Colorado. As soon as the correct information 
vras received by respondent as to the actual time of execution, 
it \vas re1ayed to appellants pursuant to their interrogatories. 
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Respondent respectfully submits that exhibits 2 and 3 
are clear and unambiguous, are in writing, and admittedly 
signed by the appellants. The genuineness of the exhibits was 
conceded by appellants' counsel (Tr. 5). Respondent had 
sustained its burden of proof. This was ably pointed out to 
counsel for the appellants by the trial judge (Tr. 246). 
At page 8 of appellants' Brief, they point to the fact 
that Schalo\v testified that the Convent bond was not executed 
until February of 1960. This statement is taken out of context 
from his testitnony and had counsel desired to be accurate, 
he would have also shown in his statement that the bond 
referred to by Mr. Schalow at this point was a bond issued 
to correct the original bond that was given in an improper 
amount of money (Tr. 54, 55). Respondent respectfully 
submits that even the appellants admit in their Brief at pages 
8 and 9 that Mr. Schalow, respondent's exclusive witness on 
its case in chief, testified that he did not know personall} 
when the indemnity agreement (Ex. 2) was signed. This 
certainly could not in any way be a contradiction when a witness 
is asked if he knows a particular fact and he admits that he 
personally does not know of this fact. 
Appellants have devoted considerable space in their Brief 
to a discussion of the bond issued on the Convent job. It should 
respectfully be brought to the court's attention that there is 
no dispute as to the applicability of the general indemnity 
agreement (Ex. 2) to that bond, and appellants have admitted 
liability for any losses under that bond. It therefore becomes 
unnecessary to further discuss additional testimony on this 
point. 
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The respondent offered, and the court properly received, 
exhibits 2 and 3 which established a prima facie case on behalf 
of the respondent. Appellants then had the burden of going 
forward to refute the documents. The documents were com-
plete, unambiguous and admittedly signed by the appellants. 
lJpon this basis, the court correctly ruled that the documents 
speak for themselves. 
POINT II 
Tl-IE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING EVI-
DENCE THAT THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS 
EXECUTED BETWEEN JANUARY 25, 1960, AND JANU-
ARY 30, 1960. 
A. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS IN WRIT-
ING AND MET THE REQUIREMENT OF THE STATUTE 
OF FRAUDS. 
B. THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOTAL-
TERED UNDER THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE. 
Respondent shall consider together the foregoing points 
raised separately by appellants so as to avoid needless repetition. 
Respondent has no quarrel with the authorities cited by 
the appellants concerning the proposition that an indemnity 
agreement promising to answer for the debt or default or mis-
carriage of another must be in writing. Exhibits 2 and 3 are 
in writing, are signed by the appellants pursuant to their own 
admission, and are clear and unambiguous in their terms. Re-
spondent fails to see the necessity of citing further authorities 
on these propositions as \\ras done by appellants. Exception 
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is taken to the statements appearing on page 12 of appellants' 
Brief '"herein they state: 
"The evidence is uncontroverted that the contract 
amount of $271,030.00 for the PIE job was not deter-
mined by either the contractor, Henich, or the plain-
tiff through its representative, Dale Barton, until some-
time after January 28, 1960." (Italics ours). 
The record clearly shows that the contract with the amount 
specified therein was delivered in Salt Lake City on January 28, 
1960, and at which time copies were immediately given to 
Henich, who on the same day delivered an unsigned copy to 
the Dale Barton Agency for the preparation of exhibits 2 
and 3 (Tr. 116, 164, 223, 224). 
Appellants also state at page 12 of their Brief that neither 
of the appellants, Andrews and Shurtleff, knew anything about 
the PIE job until July, 1960. This simply is not true, as evi-
denced by testimony of the appellants. Andrews, when asked 
by the trial judge in regard to this matter, stated that he knew 
of the job prior to this time and that he, as well as all of the 
defendants, had worked on the PIE job (Tr. 131). The 
evidence clearly shows that the appellants had furnished their 
equipment and services to Henich on the PIE job. 
In reviewing the case of Grand Junction Gospel Taber-
nacle vs. Arvis, 15 7 Pac. 2d 619, as cited by appellants at 
page 15 of their Brief, the facts readily disclose that the rule 
pronounced in that case has no appliction to the instant case. 
In that case, a promissory note was given to the plaintiff and 
was dated on its face CCOctober 28, 193 7 ." The terms of the 
note stated that it was due 5 years from date. When the note 
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became due, the plaintiff brought suit to collect on the same. 
The defendant alleged that because of the notation on the 
back of the note stating that it was dated (COctober 28, 1938," 
that the note was not yet due and they should be permitted 
by parol evidence to show this date. The Court held, at page 
620: 
c 'Change of date would change the rights of the 
parties, hence parole evidence for that purpose would 
be inadmissible." 
The court went on to say that since the changing of the due 
date on the face of the note was a material change of the terms 
of the note on its face, the proof of date of execution would 
not be permitted by either side. 
This, of course, merely conforms to the general rule. 
In the instant case, the evidence clearly shows that a change 
of date of execution by parole testimony in no way alters 
or changes the terms of the indemnity agreement. 
Appellants then continue to urge the proposition that 
proof of the actual date of execution of the documents must 
of necessity substantially modify or change the agreement by 
oral testimony. The foregoing authorities cited by respondent 
do not in any \vay agree with appellants' proposition and it 
is not deemed necessary to burden this court with a further 
recitation of authorities on this point. Argument is also put 
forth that there was no evidence as to when the appellant 
corporation held its Board meeting wherein it passed its reso-
lution as evidenced by exhibit 3. The testimony of the officers 
of _appellant corporation show that no corporate records 'vere 
kept concerning this resolution (Tr. 142 & 143). How, then, 
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does the appellant corporation expect the respondent to offer 
positive proof of the time of this special meeting when the 
corporation itself kept no record ? 
At this point, respondent finds it incumbent to demonstrate 
to this court the actual sequence of events leading up to the 
execution of exhibits 2 and 3 to refute many confusing and 
inconsistent statements of the appeliants in their brief. It 
should also be noted that a substantial portion of the evidence 
offered by the respondent to prove the actual date of execution 
was derived primarily from the testimony of the parties appel-
lant and witnesses called on their behalf. Lila Pugsley, a 
witness testifying for respondent, stated that she was formerly 
an employee of the accounting firm of Wood, Child, Mann & 
Smith, the accountants employed by the appellants (Tr. 202-
203). When Andrews was asked by counsel for respondent: 
"Q. And do you recall that there was some request on 
behalf of your company to furnish financial data 
before the indemnity agreement was signed?'' 
(Italics ours). 
«CA. I believe so." (TR. 138). 
He then testified as follows: 
"Q. Did you authorize Mr. Henich to go to your ac-
countant's office and pick up the financial state-
ments of your companies, the partnership and 
the corporation, before the signing of exhibit 2 
or exhibit 3 ?" 
"A. I don't know just when it was for positive, but I 
remember I had authorized that information to be 
given." 
"Q. And that was prior to the two exhibits being pre-
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sented to you in your office for signature and that 
of Mr. Shurtleff, was it not?" 
"A. I think it was around about that time." 
"Q. And do you know whether or not Mr. Henich 
went to the office of your accountant and picked 
up that information?" 
((A. No, I don't." 
C(Q. Now, do you recall in your deposition that . 
inviting your attention to page 19, Mr. Andrews, 
question at line 3 . . . Question: Did it come to 
your attention at that time that the Dale Barton 
Insurance Agency was handling and processing 
this application for Mr. Henich ?" · 
"A. Yes. I knew that Paul had brought the papers 
fron1, or I assumed he had, from Dale Barton. 
Mr. Dale Barton's name had been mentioned" 
!(Q. And prior to that time that the application was 
brought to you, was any request made from Henich 
that you make available to the Dale Barton 
Agency, any financial statements on your com-
pany?" 
"A. Yes, sir." 
"Q. And when was that done?" 
C«A Well, previous to the signing of these papers." 
C(Q. Did you so testify?" 
((A. Yes, sir." (TR. 139). 
Andre"\vs testified that he talked with Mrs. Pugsley or Mr. 
Wood at the accounting office and requested the financial 
infortntaion be given (Tr. 143-144). 
The appellants then called Paul J. Henich as a witness 
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on their behalf (Tr. 159 and 160). In answer to when exhibits 
2 and ) were actually executed, Henich had this to say on cross 
examination, beginning at page 175 of the transcript of tes-
timony: 
ceQ. Do you recall having any conversations with Mr. 
Shurtleff or Mr. Andrews concerning the necessity 
of that financial information before exhibit 2 was 
signed?" 
CCA. Yes." 
CCQ. What was the first contact you had with Shurtleff 
and Andrews concerning those?'' 
etA. \Vhen I was discussing the indemnity for the 
Convent in Mr. Barton's office, he wanted a finan-
cial statement and I called on Mr. Max Andre\vs 
in his office and gained permission to go back to 
Wood, Child, Mann, & Smith for a copy, and 
then Mr. Barton called Dunn & Bradstreet while 
I was there, and the credit bureau to have a verbal 
rundown.'' 
ttQ. And that was before exhibit 2 was ever prepared, 
was it not?" 
t(A. Yes." 
ttQ. But you do recall the information was requested 
before any signature was placed on exhibit No. 
2 ?" 
ttA. That's correct.'' (TR. 175-176). (Italics ours). 
Rebuttal evidence was offered by respondent in the testi-
mony of Mrs. Lila Pugsley previously mentioned above. In 
contrast to appellants' contention that exhibits 2 and 3 were 
signed on December 23, 1959, but after the financial statem.ent 
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(Ex. 15) was received, she stated as follows at page 203 of 
transcript: 
nQ. .i\nd then, Mrs. Pugsley, I show you exhibit No. 
15 and ask you if you can identify that exhibit?" 
nA. This is a copy of the statements that were pre-
pared by Wood, Child, Mann, & Smith for the 
Shurtleff & Andrews Construction Company for 
the year ended December 31, 1959." 
Transcript at page 204: 
nQ. Now, making reference to exhibit 15, what period 
did this cover ?'' 
((A. This is for the year ended December 31, 1959." 
;-fhen at page 205: 
nQ. NO\V when was exhibit No. 15 prepared in your 
office, do you know?" 
((A. Well, it would have been prepared on January 
28." 
((Q. And do you have knowledge of from what this 
exhibit was prepared, and how it was done?" 
((A. We have a copy, or a draft copy from which this 
is copied.'' 
(tQ. Now this exhibit covers the period ending when?" 
((A. Dec. 31, 1959. The year ended December 31." 
((Q. And were both of exhibits 15 and 14 typed in 
your off ice ? '' 
(tA. Yes, sir." (Italics ours). 
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Counsel for appellants then tried to shake Mrs. Pugsley's 
testimony concerning the prepartaion of their financial state-
tnent on January 28, 1960, by asking Mrs. Pugsley as follows 
(Tr. 205): 
"Q. Do you have a notation in there as to when it was 
delivered for typing?" 
CCA. January 28. Yes, sir." 
ceQ. Could that have been January 18 ?" 
CCA. No, sir." 
And at page 206: 
<CQ. Do you have any indication when the typing com-
menced on exhibit 15 ?'' 
CCA. That is - - - that was on that day, January 28." 
ceQ. What is the procedure that your office went 
through in order to finally culminate in the delivery 
of this document on January 28 ?" 
t'A. \Y/ ell, this is prepared by the accountant who is 
given the assignment and then it is given to me 
for processing in the typing department.'' 
t<Q. Did this record indicate when these different steps 
took place ?'' 
(tA. Only the date I received it and the date it goes out. 
In that instance it went out the same day." 
ceQ. And so you received it, and did you type it up?" 
t• A. I did not type it. One of our typists did that work." 
Counsel for defendants then asked at page 207: 
ttQ. Does your record indicate to whom it was de-
livered January 28 ?" 
25 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
teA. Oh, yes, it goes to the client." 
ceQ. Does your record indicate that?" 
teA. No, there is no indication of it going to any 
specific person. That is not usually our procedure. 
It is delivered to the client." 
"Q. Are these delivered manually or are they mailed 
out?" 
"A. Well, it varies. Sometimes they are mailed and 
sometimes they are delivered." 
· · Q. Does that indicate whether it was mailed or de-
livered?" 
"A. It would be delivered." 
"Q. And who would have delivered it?" 
"A. The client would have picked it up in this case." 
"Q. Does this show that?" 
etA. It does not." 
"Q. And this would have been on January 28 ?" 
"A. Yes, sir." 
Appellants' counsel then asked at page 209: 
"Q. Prior to January 28, there would have been no 
exhibit 15 in existence, would there?" 
"A. Not for that particular year." (Italics ours). 
Appellants also called their office manager, Mr. Darrel 
S. Lester, to testify concerning the date of execution of exhibits 
2 and 3. Counsel for respondent then cross-examined Mr. 
Lester as follows, commencing at transcript, bottom of page 
148: 
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"Q. Has the case been discussed with you?" 
"A. Yes ... well, not the case ... the remembrance of 
what took place on this." 
"Q. And when was that?" 
··A. At the time of the depositions.'' 
.. Q. Before the depositions were taken?" 
"A. Yes." 
"Q. You didn't give any deposition in the matter, did 
you?'' 
'CA. I did not." 
c'Q. And where did this discussion take place?" 
.. A. At the office." 
.. Q. And who was present?" 
ceA. Mr. Andrews." 
ceQ. Anyone else?" 
teA N '' 
. o. 
ceQ. And what was discussed at that time?'' 
tcA. He asked if I would please try to remember the 
incident and what took place. He asked if I could 
remember changing the document. I told him . . . 
yes, I could. And he asked if I could remember 
when." 
"Q. And then what was said by you?" 
teA. I told him right at the time I could remember 
making the change on the document, but I couldn't 
remembef when." 
"The court: But you couldn't remember what?" 
.. A. But I couldn't remember the exact time." 
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((The court: Do you mean the date? Or the hour?'· 
((A. The date." (TR. 148-149). Italics ours). 
It appears clear from the testimony of the appellants and 
witnesses called on their behalf that exhibit 2 and exhibit 3 were 
not executed by the appellants until after their financial state-
ment was delivered to the Dale Barton Agency for examination. 
The employee of appellants' accounting firm testified without 
qualification that the financial statement prepared on Shurtleff 
and Andrews Constructoin Company was not prepared or 
delivered until January 28, 1960. With the admissions of the 
appellants and their witness Henich that exhibits 2 and 3 had 
not been executed until after the financial statement was pre-
pared, it appears unequivocal to us, as it did to the trial 
court, that exhibits 2 and 3 were signed on or after January 28, 
1960. 
Appellants, at page 14 of their brief, also speculate as 
to what other documents may have been signed by the appel-
lants that were supposedly complete in themselves. Respondent 
respectfully points out the inconsistency of the statements of 
the appellants and their own witnesses concerning exhibits 2 
and 3. Some of the witnesses claim that page one of exhibit 
2 was blank when it was signed by the appellants; others claim 
that part of the typing was there. When Henrich was called 
to testify by appellants he gave the following answers to ques-
tions propounded by counsel for respondent rr r. 170, 171): 
((Q. Making reference to exhibits 2 and 3, have you 
ever seen those documents before?" 
((A. In part, I have." 
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'· Q. In making reference to exhibit 2, what do you 
mean 'in part you have'?'' 
"A. By in part, I am referring to page 3, the bottom 
area where the signatures and typing is." 
"Q. And what about that." 
"A. Max S. Andrews and Ned Shurtleff and Paul 
Henich and Max S. Andrews." 
''Q. Was typing ... that typing on there when you 
took it down?" 
"A. That is correct." 
"Q. Was there any other typing on that document?" 
"A N . '' 
. o, str. 
"Q. How about exhibit No. 3 ?" 
"A. I don't recall this one at all, sir." 
"Q. You don't recall ever seeing that exhibit?" 
''A N . '' 
. o, str. 
Then at page 176: 
"Q. And I think you said in reference to exhibit No,. 2 
that none of the names were typed on that docu-
ment at the time it was taken to Shurtleff & An-
drews, is that correct?" 
"A. No, sir. No, sir, you misunderstood me." 
"Q. What was it?" 
"A. This is the exhibit No. 1, sir." 
"Q. Excuse me. Exhibit No. 2 is right here." 
"A. I said the only thing I acknowledged was on the 
bottom of page three where it was typed." 
"Q. Were the names typed there?" 
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(CA. Yes, sir." 
((Q. And the check marks for the signatures?" 
(CA. Yes, sir." 
««Q. Now, Mr. Henich, I would like to invite your 
attention to your deposition now, on page 18. I 
first asked you: 
CQ. Did you sign this document down in Shurtleff 
& Andrews' office?" 
CA. I signed that particular document in Max An-
drews' office." 
My question at line 15: 
t Q. I' 11 ask you if there was any typing on page 
three when you signed it?' 
CA. No, sir. The only thing that was on there was 
the check marks.' 
CQ. Just the check marks?' 
CA. Yes, sir.' 
CQ. And none of the names were typed on it?' 
CA. No, sir. That was completely blank when I 
first signed it. The only thing there was the 
checks where they were to sign, and I was to 
sign.' 
ceQ. Do you recall so testifying?" 
ceA. If it is in the deposition, I must have said it." 
ceQ. Do you know how this exhibit 3, the resolution, 
got down to Shurtleff and Andrews' office?" 
ceA. I must have taken it, sir." 
CCQ. Was that taken at the same time as exhibit 2 ?" 
ceA. It must have been." 
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· 'Q. I am inviting your attention again to the deposi-
tion on page 19, commencing at the bottom of 
page 18, Mr. Henich: 
'Q. At that time did you have a document entitled 
Copy of Resolution?' 
'A. No, sir, I did not.' 
'Q. You have never seen that document before?' 
'A. This document?' 
'Q. Yes.' 
'A. No, sir, I haven't.' 
'Q. And this was not taken by you down to Shurt-
leff & Andrews?' 
'A. No, sir.' 
c•Q. Did you so testify?" 
"A. I still so testified, sir." (TR. 170, 178). 
This witness then went on to testify that at the time exhibit 
2 was delivered to Shurtleff & Andrews there was no typing 
on page 1 of the document (Tr. 177-178). When Mr. Andrews 
was asked on cross-examination if any of the typing appeared 
on page 1 of exhibit 2 he stated that the exhibit was blank 
on page 1 when he signed it (Tr. 141). In contrast, appel-
lants' office manager, Lester, who was present when the 
exhibits were executed and who admittedly changed the name 
of one of the corporate officers on exhibits 2 and 3 to correct 
the same, was asked if there was any typing other than print-
ing on page 1 of exhibit 2, and he answered as follows (Tr. 
147): 
"Q. When you saw these documents, what was pre-
pared on them ... making reference to exhibit 
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2, insofar as the typing on the exhibit was con-
cerned?" 
etA. I don't know." 
''Q. Do you know whether or not there was any typing 
on page 1 ?" 
''A. I know it wasn't blank, yes. I don't know what was 
there. There was something on these, yes." 
''The court: Which exhibit is he referring to?" 
''Q. Exhibit 2. Do you recall the names on there being 
ty d I" pe . 
''A y ,, 
. es. 
''Q. They were there?'' 
"A. Yes." (Italics ours). 
The evidence also shows that Henich denied delivering 
exhibit 3 to the appellants for signature but their testimony 
indicates that they received it from Henich at the same time 
they signed exhibit 2 (Tr. 122, 150, 151 and 177). 
Respondent respectfully submits that the testimony of the 
appellants, their witnesses, and the independent testimony 
of their accountants' former employee, shows conclusively that 
exhibits 2 and 3 had been typed, and were then signed by the 
appellants during the week of January 25 through January 
30, 1960. The trial court so found based upon clear and con-
vincing evidence. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
INDE~1NITY AGREEMENT COVERED THE P.I.E. BOND. 
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A. THERE WAS NO ALTERATION OF THE IN-
DEMNITY AGREEMENT. 
B. THE DATE ON THE INSTRUMENTS WAS IM-
MA'"fERIAL AS TO THE LIABILITY OF THE APPEL-
LANTS AS INDEMNITORS. 
Appellants offered no testimony upon which the court 
could base a finding that exhibits 2 and 3 had been altered 
after they had been signed by the appellants. The trial court 
found that the two exhibits evidenced no indication of erasures 
·whatsoever. There was no indication of placing additional 
typewritten matter on the documents after they had been origi-
nally typed and the documents contained a full description 
of the bonds to be indemnified. The court further pointed out 
to counsel for the appellants that even the appellants and 
t9eir witnesses contradicted themselves as to what the docu-
ments contained when they signed them (Tr. 248-249). The 
trial court found the evidence to be clear and convincing in 
respondent's favor. This court said in the case of Northcrest, 
Inc. vs. Walker Bank & Trust Company, supra: 
C(His findings should not be disturbed unless we must 
say that no one could reasonably find the evidence to 
be clear and convincing.'' 
See also Child vs. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 Pac. 2d 981, 
wherein this court recently stated: 
nit is because of such areas of uncertainty and the 
fact that the workings of another human mind are 
quite impossible to measure with exactness, that it is 
necessary in large measure to leave the determination 
of what constitutes 'clear and unconvincing' evidence 
to the trial judge." 
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At page 17 of the appellants' Brief, they state that Mr. 
Lester corroborates the testimony of Andrews and ShurtleH 
that they signed the documents on December 23, 1959. As 
shown above, however, Lester's testimony was that he could 
not recall when the signing of the documents took place 
even though Mr. Andrews asked him to please remember. The 
testimony of witness Eldredge, as cited by the appellants, is 
of no material value to anyone as he did not hear any con-
versation between Henich and the appellants that is pertinent 
to this matter (Tr. 159). Mr. Lester also testified that exhibit 
2 had typing on page 1 but he could not recall exactly what 
had been typed thereon. At this point, it is respectfully sub-
mitted by respondent that had exhibit 2 been signed without 
any typing on page 1 as to the Convent and PIE jobs, the 
appellants would have then become indemnitors for Henich 
on any and all bonds that had been, or were to be written in 
the future, for Henich, without regard to only these two jobs. 
The language of exhibit 2 so states on page one thereof, com-
mencing at line 29, paragraph (second." The appellants would 
still be obligated, under the terms of the agreement, on the 
PIE job. The limitation of indemnity specified on page 1 was 
placed there by the Dale Barton Agency for the sole benefit 
of the appellants prior to their signing the document so 
that they would not become general indemnitors for Henich 
on every job that he had undertaken or would undertake in 
the future. Appellants state at page 17 of their brief: 
('The agreement was only signed in connection with 
and to indemnify the St. Joseph Convent job." 
This, of course, is parole evidence of a self-serving nature 
\vh!ch alters the terms of a written document and is in violation 
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of the parole evidence rule. The appellants also agree that at 
no titne did they ever discuss their liability or limitation 
thereof \vith Dale Barton, anyone from the Dale Barton 
Agency, or the respondent (Tr. 140-141 & 144). There was 
absolutely no corroboration of any of appellants' evidence 
concerning the dates on exhibit 2 or exhibit 3. As previously 
shown, the appellant corporation's officers could not state 
when the corporate meeting approving exhibit 3 was held as 
they kept no corporate minutes of the meeting. It is main-
tained by the appellants that the date of execution of the 
contract must be definite. The evidence shows with reasonable 
certainty that the indemnity agreement and corporate resolu-
tion, exhibits 2 and 3, were signed sometime between January 
25 and January 30, 1960. Respondent also submits that the 
indemnity agreement and corporate resolution (exhibits 2 
and 3) speak for themselves and the date they bear is not 
material in and of itself. Appellants further rely on the rather 
extensive testimony of Mr. Schalow, as quoted in their brief 
commencing on page 19. It has been previously shown that 
Mr. Schalow was an administrative employee of the respondent 
and had no personal first-hand knowledge of the facts sur-
rounding the execution of exhibits 2 and 3. However, witness 
Schalow testified that it was his information exhibit 2 had 
been signed after December 23, 1959, and sometime near the 
end of January, 1960, to the best of his knowledge and infor-
mation (Tr. 41 & 42). The testimony of Mrs. Farley, the 
person who typed exhibits 2 and 3 and later acknowledged 
them, \vas specific to the effect that the documents were executed 
during the \veek of January 25 to January 30, 1960. As pre-
viously sho,vn, even the appellants and their witnesses indicate 
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that this must be true. The documents could only have been 
executed on or after January 28, 1960, as indicated by the 
testimony of Mrs. Pugsley, who prepared the financial state-
ment of the partnership, and the testimony of witness Lifferth, 
who delivered the PIE contract to Henich on that date. It 
would be incredible to expect Mrs. Farley to remember the 
exact date of execution of the documents, based on her affixing 
her notary seal, after one and a half years had elapsed. 
The testimony of Lloyd S. Foote, a former employee of 
the Dale Barton Agency, shows that he called the accounting 
jirnz of Wood, Child, Mann & Smith by telephone and obtained 
the names of the officers of Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc. This 
\vas done on the day exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared and this 
information was given to Mrs. Farley to prepare these docu-
ments (Tr. 196 and 197). He also stated, as shown on page 
21 of appellants' brief, that he was sure the documents were 
prepared at the same time the PIE contract was received in 
the Dale Barton offices. 
Again at page 21, counsel for appellants tries to confuse 
the evidence by saying: 
((Exhibit 14 had been delivered October 12, 1959, 
and covered only the Shurtleff & Andrews, Inc., cot· 
poration up to the end of July, 1959." 
This was taken from the testimony of Mrs. Pugsley to the 
effect that the appellants' accounting firm had prepared a 
financial statement on the corporation and delivered the same, 
but she did not testify where it was delivered. Obviously, this 
statetnent \vas delivered to the appellant corporation for other 
purposes. There is no conflict in the evidence in regard to 
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when the financial statements were delivered to the Barton 
Agency. Appellants also state that Barton did not testify as 
to ho\v long it was after he received the financial statements 
before exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared. This, of course, 
indicates nothing more than the fact that Barton did not per-
sonally type the agreements. Mrs. Farley stated that she typed 
the agreements and gave them to Henich to obtain the appel-
lants' signatures. She also stated that this was done sometime 
during the week of January 25 through January 30, 1960. 
This corresponds to the time in which the financial statements 
were received by the Dale Barton Agency. It must be remem-
bered that the finanical statement covering the partnership, 
Shurtleff and Andrews Construction Company, covered the 
period ending on December 31, 1959, and wasn't even in exist-
ence until January 28, 1960 (Tr. 209). 
Counsel for the appellants, for lack of facts or legal 
authorities to sustain their position, makes reckless statements 
alleging contradictions in respondent's evidence and in doing 
so, contradicts himself. He states at the top of page 22 in his 
Brief that Barton never testified as to how long it was after 
he received the financial information on the appellants before 
exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared, and then accuses Mrs. Farley 
of contradicting Barton's testimony by stating when she in 
fact typed the documents. The testimony clearly shows that 
the financial information and the PIE contract were received 
before exhibits 2 and 3 were prepared and that exhibits 2 
and 3 were signed sometime during the latter part of the 
week, January 25-January 30, 1960. Respondent fails to see 
anything contradictory about this testimony. Appellants then 
go on to state that the Dun & Bradstreet report, exhibit 16, 
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\vas not received by Barton until February 11, 1960. They 
again attempt to cloud the issues. The testimony was very 
clear that an oral Dun & Bradstreet report was received prior 
to exhibit 16 and the exhibit was merely sent to the Dale 
Barton Agency to confirm the oral report (Tr. 105-106 & 175). 
A.ppellants again misconstrue the evidence cited in their 
Brief at page 22. Mr. Foote testified that he saw the financial 
statement on the appellant corporation and therefore, knowing 
\vho its accountants were, made a telephone call (Tr. 197). 
No where in his testimony does he state that it was from the 
financial statement that he obtained the names of the parties 
placed on exhibits 2 and 3. 
The second paragraph on page 23 of appellants' Brief 
is also a misconstruction of the facts. The testimony clearly 
sho\vs that on January 28th, Henich received the PIE contract 
and delivered a copy thereof to the Barton Agency (Tr. 116, 
164, 223). Barton testified that when he was first contacted 
by Henich concerning a bond, he told Henich he would not 
\vrite the bond with only the indemnity of the appellant cor-
poration, and it was two days after this that Henich secured 
the partnership financial statement and the contract, and 
brought them to Barton for consideration. It was at this time, 
January 28th, that Barton had exhibits 2 and 3 prepared and 
delivered to Henich for the appellants' signatures. Shurtleff 
testified that he was in Gabbs, Nevada, during the week in 
question and stated that he had parfied with three persons 
on the night of January 27, 1960, at a party given by an 
engineering company. He also gave the names of those persons 
but never called any of then1 to testify on his behalf concerning 
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his presence in Nevada, nor did he give any reason for failing 
to do so ( T r. 15 2) . 
The rule is correctly stated in 20 Am. Jur ., Evidence, p. 
L92, Sec. 187, as follows: 
"It is well settled that if a party fails to produce the 
testimony of an available witness on a material issue 
in the cause, it may be inferred that his testimony, if 
presented, would be adverse to the party who fails 
to call the witness.'' 
The author also states at page 193, Sec. 188: 
"But if an interested party tells an improbable story, 
the absence of the corroborating testimony of witnesses 
who, it appears, were cognizant of the facts, will weigh 
heavily against him." 
Appellants introduced into evidence exhibit 19, which 
is a group of alleged receipts given to Shurtleff while on this 
purported trip to Nevada. It is respectfully pointed out that 
the receipts clearly show they were written by this witness 
personally and a.re not worthy of belief (Tr. 156). It should 
be noted that the signature appearing on the purported 
expense account submitted by Mr. Shurtleff is also the very 
same signature appearing at the top of the receipt from the 
Gabbs Valley Inn as well as that on the Hotel Nevada receipt 
(Ex. 19). The exhibit also shows an adding machine tape dated 
Febt'uary 2, 1960, and includes a guest check from the Gabbs 
Coffee Shop in the sum of $2.45 which bears the date of 
Januat"y 27, 1961, a year later. The entire exhibit appears 
tainted by false testimony. Mr. Shurtleff was very careful not 
to place the names of any persons allegedly making these 
receipts upon the receipt so that they could be verified. If 
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Shurtleff had in fact made this trip to Nevada as he testified, 
in view of the magnitude of this case, it seems incredible 
that he didn't bring at least one live witness to Salt Lake City 
to testify in his behalf. The conclusion is inescapable, he never 
n1ade the trip at the time he clain1s. 
Appellants continually try to shift their burden of proof 
to the respondent by completely ignoring the terms of the 
\vritten contract. It is respectfully submitted that the burden 
was theirs and they failed in their proof. Their evidence was 
neither clear nor convincing, and the trial court so found. 
C. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT 
THE INDEMNITY AGREEMENT WAS NOT EXECUTED 
DECEMBER 23, 1959. 
There is no dispute by any of the parties or witnesses that 
Doris Farley notarized exhibits 2 and 3. Appellants state at 
page 26 of their Brief that respondent never gave them notice 
of its acceptance of the indemnity agreement they had signed. 
As the indemnity agreement was a clear and unequivocal 
contract to indemnify with an absolute guarantee, notice of 
acceptance by the plaintiff was unnecessary. Wall vs. Eccles, 
61 Utah 247, 211 Pac. 702, Brown vs. Merriott, 97 Utah 65, 
89 P. 2d 478. 
The testimony cited by appellants and their argument 
commencing on page 25 of their Brief, and continuing through 
page 28 thereof, is nothing more than a restatement of what 
has already been discussed. It constitutes a series of misstate-
ments, statements taken out of context, and assumptions not 
based upon evidence. Accordingly, respondent \vill not burden 
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this court with further repetition of argument pertaining there-
to, as the trial court's findings are amply supported by evidence 
against the appellants on those matters. 
Suffice it to again say, that Mr. Lester's testimony on 
cross-examination, as to the date of execution of the indemnity 
agreement and corporate resolution (exhibits 2 and 3) was 
to the effect that he couldn't remember the date even though 
Andre\vs, his employer, asked him to please try and remember 
(Tr. 149). Lester's testimony is no stronger than that given 
on cross-examination. In support of that doctrine, this court's 
attention is respectfully invited to the cases of Alvarado vs. 
Tucker, 2 Utah 2d 16, 268 Pac. 2d 986, and I vie vs. Richardson, 
9 Utah 2d 5, 336 Pac. 2d 781 ( 1959). 
It should also be said in conclusion on this point, that 
appellants' contention on the top of page 28 in their brief that 
it is uncontroverted that the indemnity agreement only applied 
to the Convent job, and that plaintiff added the PIE job to the 
agreement, is wholly unsupported by any evidence adduced 
by them during the trial of this case. There was absolutely 
no testimony during the trial of any alteration of this instru-
ment done by respondent, and even the witnesses testifying 
on behalf of appellants were in conflict as to the typewritten 
portion appearing on this indemnity agreement (Exhibit 2), 
at the time they executed the same. We have heretofore fully 
covered this element of the case, and this appears to be another 
statement by appellants' counsel calculated to mislead this 
Court as to actually what occurred under the circumstances. 
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POINT IV 
RESPONDENT MADE NO ADMISSIONS PRECLUD-
ING THE TRIAL COURT FROM FINDING IN ITS 
FAVOR. 
The answers to interrogatories served by appellants were 
unequivocal as to the position to be taken by the respondent, 
and the same were made a part of the pretrial order as previously 
stated (R. 51 to 57). It is also perfectly clear from the record 
that appellants sought to alter the provisions of exhibits 2 
and 3 by parol testimony, and of course they had no evidence 
in that respect. Counsel v1as aware of respondent's position at 
the time of trial (Tr. 6 & 7). 
In reference to their claim that respondent's proof was 
a material deviation from the allegations set forth in its com-
plaint, this is wholly without merit because the pre-trial order 
clearly stated the issues to be determined by the trial court. 
The evidence adduced at trial fully supports the Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law as entered by the trial judge, 
and the cases heretofore cited are in accord with the law as 
applied thereto by the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellants admit signing exhibits 2 and 3. They 
also agree that the respondent suffered a loss by virtue of 
its executing the bond on the PIE job. The testimony is clear 
that exhibits 2 and 3 were typed, signed, and acknowledged 
during the \veek commencing January 25, 1960. The terms 
of both exhibits are clear and unambiguous. The respondent 
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presented a prima facie case against the appellants and they 
were unable to overcome respondent's proof. The testimony 
of the appellants and their witnesses clearly shows that exhibits 
2 and 3 were executed at the time and for the purpose alleged 
by respondent. It is the appellants and not the respondent 
who are attempting to alter the terms of the written instruments 
by parol evidence. The evidence further shows that the bonds 
on both the Convent job and the PIE job were dated to conform 
to the date of the contracts, and that the same were not in 
fact executed on the dates they bear, nor was the contract 
on the PIE job executed on the date that it bears of January 25, 
1960. See the testimony of witness Lifferth (Tr. 112 to 119). 
This demonstrates the usual practice in business matters of 
this nature requiring the bonds to be dated and effective on 
the same dates as the contracts bear. Many instruments are 
given a date and mailed to various places for signature and 
execution. If such documents can be modified or nullified by 
showing that they were not signed on the date contained 
therein it would become in many instances virtually impossible 
to do business. After appellants raised the issue of the date 
of execution in reference to the indemnity agreement signed 
by them, and the corporate resolution (Exhibits 2 and 3), 
the respondent had every right to show the true date of execu-
tion of such documents, and this in no way altered the terms 
or provisions thereof. The lower court found the evidence 
to be clearly in favor of the respondent and so stated in its 
partial summary of the evidence commencing on page 241 
of the transcript. The summary contained in the Brief of 
appellants is apparently designed to influence this Court's 
revieVv· of this case by appealing to its sympathy and attempting 
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to rest upon the virtuous conduct of appellants. It is they 
who came into court with un-clean hands and their testimony 
is replete with inconsistencies, coupled with evidence fabricated 
to meet the exigencies of the situation. This approach was 
apparent as the trial court, as indicated in part by his sum-
mation, at the conclusion of the trial, wherein he said (Tr. 
248 & 249): 
nTHE COURT: Now on that, Mr. Pratt, they are 
not even consistent on their testimony. Mr. Andrews, 
he said the contract was filled out with the exception 
of the P .I.E. provision which was not in there; his 
partner, Mr. Shurtleff, says it was a complete blank. 
.A ... nd Mr. Henich says it was a complete blank. But 
their office manager says it was not a blank but he 
doesn't remember what was in it. Then they are con-
tradicting each other, you see, in their own area so 
to speak, and then, of course, as I said to Mr. Bayle, 
that it was in their is confirmed by independent people, 
such as Mrs. Pugsley. 
Now I have seen men, and men that sometimes make 
lots of money. They win big and they lose big by this 
kind of conduct. They are reckless and they don't an-
ticipate or foresee or pay attention to the ultimate 
possible dire results; the very thing that you have here. 
Now here this loss to them is $140,000.00 plus 
these extras, attorney fees in these lawsuits, which is 
a fortune. I don't know what it will do to them. It may 
even bankrupt them. But they did it and they should 
have anticipated if this contractor turned out to be 
less than what they thought he was their loss could 
have been~ of course, to the ultimate end of $270,000.00. 
As it turns out it is $145,000.00 plus these other things. 
And I don't just see any escape from it, myself, and, 
as I say, this matter of date is not important. They 
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are not in or they are not out by virtue of the change 
of the date, except the opposite way for them to con-
tradict or modify the written contract that is here. 
I am satisfied that this contract was, on its face, 
like it is today. There is no indication of erasures; 
there is no indication of putting it again in a type-
writer where they might vary the line or vary the 
spacing between words. There is a bracket mark that 
encompasses this full limitation. Of course that could 
have been put on if it were a blank. But then what 
business have men signing blank instruments. I'm not 
sure that that would even avail them of anything. 
They would still have to convince the tryer of facts 
that they didn't intend to be bound by the P.I.E. job 
and the Convent job, even if it were in blank. But they 
contradict themselves on that, you see. 
I just think it is one of those sad situations and it 
really is. It is deplorable that men should take a loss 
like this. But then, after all, they contracted to do that 
and they contracted with this insurance company and 
they relied on it. Otherwise, they wouldn't have issued 
the bond, and I regret it. I feel sorry for them. I think 
it is just pathetic that men get into situations like this. 
It really kind of hurts me to see the case come out 
as I think the evidence absolutely points it must. 
I think if I close my eyes to the fact that they are 
going to lose all of this money I would be violating 
my duty here. The chips will just have to fall where they 
may, but that is the way I see it." 
Justice dictates that the judgment of the lower court should 
be affirmed, with costs to respondent. 
F. ROBERT BAYLE and 
WALLACE R. LAUCHNOR of 
HURD, BAYLE & HURD 
Attorneys for Plaintiff ana 
Respondent 
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